Despite its size and resources, the Nigerian military continues to struggle against insurgents in the northeast of the country. These failures reveal deeper structural weaknesses in strategy, leadership, and doctrine, writes Fatai Alli.
The Nigerian military’s recent territorial losses in Borno State to Islamist insurgents have drawn alarm from national leaders. These setbacks are not sudden failures of professional capability or the result of the superior strength of the enemy. The issue lies in recurring patterns of ineffective strategy, tactical weakness, and a systemic failure to adapt.
Nigeria’s military continues to suffer from inadequate mobility, poor night-fighting capability, and an inability to reinforce or hold positions. Ground surveillance is also weak, which allows insurgents to strike by surprise. This is not about a lack of equipment; it reflects a deep-rooted failure in operational doctrine and training.
Over-reliance on Special Forces
Rather than empowering regular infantry units, the Nigerian Army has relied heavily on designated “Special Forces” to carry out offensive operations. As a result, conventional units have been relegated to policing roles involving confidence patrols, operating checkpoints, or remaining largely confined to bases. Meanwhile, the Special Forces have been overused but under-supported, and have become fatigued, demoralised, and increasingly ineffective over time.
A dangerous myth has been created that only elite units can fight insurgents. In the past, operations now regarded as “special” were routinely conducted by Nigeria’s regular infantry battalions. During the 1990s, these units demonstrated their combat capability in diverse theatres such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia.
Today, that level of combat effectiveness has significantly declined. The majority of regular units lack the offensive training, equipment, and mindset needed for combat. Troops conduct patrols in unserviceable vehicles, suffer from fatigue, and endure harsh, isolated conditions with no rotation or relief in sight. As many Nigerian troops have reported, the absence of clear rest and rotation protocols contributes directly to low morale and poor effectiveness.
A broken cycle of reaction and complacency
When insurgents strike, politicians call emergency meetings, and the military rushes in with hastily assembled units labelled “special forces.” Though marginally better trained, sometimes with limited foreign support, these units fall short of true special forces standards. The label is mostly political, a signal of resolve rather than capability. Over time, this practice has created a perception that only these units can go on the offensive, while the regular infantry has been sidelined to static, defensive roles. The result is a skewed doctrine and a weakened force.
These new forces might achieve temporary successes, but the pattern soon repeats. Once relative calm is restored, the military reverts to passive policing. Insurgents regroup. Attacks resume. And the military, again caught off guard, starts the cycle anew.
Meanwhile, previously deployed units are left with degraded firepower, unserviceable weapons, and no strategic plan for recovery or re-equipping. Leadership mistakes the lull as success, until the next wave of violence erupts.
Building a sustainable fighting force
To break this cycle, Nigeria needs to systematically rebuild its infantry and support units into offensive fighting forces capable of taking and holding territory.
Every deployed battalion must have the required capacity in firepower, mobility, logistics, and night-fighting readiness. Rotation plans should be strictly implemented to avoid troop burnout. Units must train, fight, rest, and retrain in structured 6-month cycles, so there is always a balance of forces actively fighting, recuperating, or preparing.
This is more than a logistical fix; it’s a cultural reset. The belief that regular troops are just for checkpoints and policing must end. All combat units should be trained and equipped to fight, with integrated support from mortars, guided weapons, mobile artillery, and helicopters. The goal is not merely to hold ground, but to systematically eliminate insurgent bases, disrupt their communications, and restrict their mobility with precision and persistence.
Leadership is the missing link
This transformation requires more than weapons. It will demand leadership, organisation, and political will. Special forces should be used sparingly, for missions that genuinely require their skills. Regular infantry units must reclaim their role as the backbone of Nigeria’s defence.
Military doctrine must prioritise 24-hour, continuous operations, coordinated across intelligence, reconnaissance, and firepower. Troops should be regimented and deployed as cohesive units, not scattered teams with unclear roles. Most importantly, a system must be in place to continuously upgrade equipment, skills, and morale before the next crisis hits.
Nigeria’s military setbacks in the northeast are not inevitable. They are the result of flawed strategy, institutional neglect, and failed leadership. Reversing this trend requires urgent investment in regular forces, disciplined operational cycles, and serious reform in military thinking and planning.
The window to act is closing fast, as insurgents expand their reach and leverage new technologies to become more sophisticated, using cheap drones and off-the-shelf tech to gain tactical advantage while regional cooperation continues to unravel.
The longer Nigeria remains locked in its habitual cycle of reaction and complacency, the more entrenched the threat becomes. The real obstacle is not a lack of resources, but a deeper, systemic failure. There is a lack of a strategic culture that is shared by both military and political leaders and defined by complacency, self-deception, and institutional inertia.
This inertia has delayed essential reforms for too long. Without decisive intervention, Nigeria risks a protracted and more costly conflict on multiple fronts. Yet the path to recovery remains open. With focused leadership, a commitment to rebuilding its regular forces, and the political will to act, Nigeria can still turn the tide. The alternative is bleak: sustained violence, mounting losses, and a downward spiral of instability.
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