AT FIRST GLANCE the images of soldiers in a television studio on September 30th, some of them masked and bristling with guns (see picture), were almost indistinguishable from those broadcast in Burkina Faso in January, when the army overthrew an elected president, Roch Kaboré. Yet these were of a new coup, led by a group of junior officers. Eight months ago the leader of the first Burkinabe putsch of 2022, Lieutenant-Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, sought to justify it by saying the government was failing to defeat jihadists who had overrun much of the country. This time Captain Ibrahim Traoré, the new 34-year-old strongman, referred in a statement to the “deterioration of the security situation”. As if following the same manual, the new junta closed Burkina Faso’s airports, imposed a curfew and suspended what is left of the constitution.
Burkina Faso is struggling badly in the fight against jihadists loosely affiliated with al-Qaeda and Islamic State (see chart). By mid-September over 3,100 people had been killed in the fighting this year, a third more than the total for the whole of last year. Nearly 2m people have been forced from their homes overall, and unknown numbers will die prematurely because insecurity has made them poorer. The second coup seems to be setting Burkina Faso on a similar path to its neighbour, Mali, which is teetering on the edge of chaos and is isolated within the region after coups in 2020 and 2021.
Colonel Damiba raised expectations by suggesting in April that he would deliver results—such as making the country safer—within six months. Instead the army has floundered. Soldiers complain of inadequate kit and support. Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), an al-Qaeda offshoot, controls large swathes of territory, including towns such as Solenzo in western Burkina Faso, and operates in, or maintains suffocating blockades of, many other towns, says Héni Nsaibia of Menastream, a risk consultancy. Perhaps reflecting the army’s divisions, on September 12th Colonel Damiba sacked his defence minister and took the role himself. Just two weeks later a 150-truck convoy taking supplies to the northern town of Djibo was wiped out by jihadists, who burned dozens of vehicles, killed 11 soldiers and injured 28. About 50 civilians are missing. Many are presumed to be dead.
It seems vanishingly unlikely that another coup will solve Burkina Faso’s problems. Greater instability seems more probable. During the coup troops surged onto the streets of Ouagadougou, the capital, firing their weapons, even as the army was supposed to be conducting a big anti-jihadist operation in the centre of the country, called Laabingol 2. The coup in January happened on the last day of Laabingol 1, Mr Nsaibia points out. Soldiers who spend their time scheming presumably have little left for stopping terrorists.
The coup is likely to deepen Burkina Faso’s isolation from democratic neighbours such as Ivory Coast and Niger, whose help the country desperately needs to police its porous borders. Colonel Damiba had agreed only in July with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a regional bloc, to return Burkina Faso to civilian rule in March 2024. That deadline will surely be missed.
The tortured language the latest pustchists used to justify their act raises questions about their sincerity. They lambasted the interim government’s “red tape”, which hardly sounds like a reason for storming the national television station, and claimed they had been “gradually” convinced that they had to act. Eight months is barely enough time to organise a wedding, let alone fix a country beset by jihadists. It remains unclear how much control Captain Traoré has over the rest of the armed forces. Further infighting seems likely. This was Burkina’s 11th coup or attempted coup since 1946. Few have brought stability.
Another question is what this will mean for Burkina’s international security partners. Mr Damiba had quietly continued relatively close military co-operation with France, which has a special-forces base on the edge of Ouagadougou. As the coup unfolded a small group of locals hit the streets of Ouagadougou waving Burkinabe and Russian flags. Fed up with France’s failure to restore order, they called for greater Russian involvement. They should be careful what they wish for. In Mali, where Russian mercenaries from Wagner Group have replaced French forces, security has grown worse and the Russian gunmen have been accused of taking part, with Malian soldiers, in the massacre of hundreds of civilians. It is not yet known whether Captain Traoré will seek Russian help to preserve his unelected regime.
Before the coup, Colonel Damiba was trying to hold peace talks with jihadist groups, with the aim of demobilising rebel fighters. Captain Traoré emphasises fighting over talking: he thinks the army should be reorganised for “counter-offensives”. He criticised his predecessor’s “political adventures” and said his “risky choices” have weakened Burkina’s security system.
ECOWAS declared the coup “inopportune”. That is one way to put it. Another would be to say that it is the latest grim sign that jihadists are winning both on and off the battlefield in the Sahel and that Burkinabes will continue to suffer. ■
